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I. INTRODUCTION 
 Delaware law is the leading source of non-federal law 
governing U.S. business organizations.1  Over the past twenty-five 
 
       †  Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law; Founding 
DirectorMitchell Fellows Program; A.B. Harvard College, 1972; J.D. Yale Law 
School, 1979.  Professor Kleinberger’s work depends, as always, on the love, 
support, and insights of Carolyn C.S. Kleinberger. 
 1. Mohsen Manesh, Legal Asymmetry and the End of Corporate Law, 34 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 465, 476 (2009); Faith Stevelman, Regulatory Competition, Choice of Forum, 
and Delaware’s Stake in Corporate Law, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 57, 66–67 (2009) (“The 
statistics reflecting Delaware’s dominance in the chartering business are subject 
only to slight variation year to year. . . . Nearly sixty percent of the Fortune 500 
companies and nearly the same proportion of those listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange are Delaware corporations.  In addition, seventy percent of initial public 
offerings in 2004 on the New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange, 
and the NASDAQ were Delaware corporations.  Moreover, . . . ninety-seven 
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years that law has tilted further and further toward insulating 
individuals who manage business firms from any liability to the 
firms’ owners based on claims of incompetence.2  These 
developments have occurred both in corporate law and the law of 
unincorporated organizations.3 
These developments in Delaware law are often described as 
consistent with market principles,4 but excessive protection of firm 
managers5 undercuts the proper functioning of a market system.  
Effective competition among firms does not require a “dog eat dog” 
mentality within firms.  Managerial responsibility is a prerequisite to 
healthy firms,6 which in turn are a prerequisite to a healthy market 
 
percent of all U.S. public companies incorporate either in their home state or in 
Delaware.  For firms choosing to incorporate outside their home state, eighty-five 
percent choose Delaware, and in total, Delaware accounts for fifty-eight percent of 
all U.S. public company charters.  Consistent with these statistics, though scholars 
disagree about the reasons for and the impact of Delaware’s success, its 
preeminence as the purveyor of nationally-relevant corporate law is beyond 
dispute.” (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted)). 
 2. In the unincorporated realm, the insulation can extend to the duty of 
loyalty as well.  See infra Part V.  That issue is largely beyond the scope of this essay, 
which primarily considers insulation from claims for incompetence. 
 3. For an interesting assertion that, according to Delaware’s constitution, 
the Delaware legislature cannot do what it has emphatically stated it is doing (i.e., 
authorize private agreements to eliminate fiduciary duty), see Lyman Johnson, 
Delaware’s Non-Waivable Duties, 91 B.U. L. REV. 701 (2011). 
 4. Manesh, supra note 1, at 470 (“[C]ontractarians argue, on freedom of 
contract principles, that corporate law should permit shareholders to waive or 
modify the fiduciary duties of their corporate managers.”); see also, e.g., Larry E. 
Ribstein, Unlimited Contracting in the Delaware Limited Partnership and Its Implications 
for Corporate Law, 16 J. CORP. L. 299, 302–10 (1991) (analyzing and advocating an 
opt-out provision for corporations). 
 5. U.S. law lacks an umbrella term to encompass directors of a corporation 
as well as those with the highest authority in various unincorporated enterprises.  
This paper uses the word “manager” to indicate those persons who collectively (or, 
if only one person, solely): (1) determine important policies for an enterprise; (2) 
superintend the enterprise’s overall operations; and (3) exercise ultimate and, as 
appropriate, active control over matters of key strategic importance to the 
enterprise.  In this sense, directors of a corporation are managers, as are the 
general partners of a limited partnership, the managers of a manager-managed 
limited liability company, and the members of a member-managed limited liability 
company. 
 6. See Surendra Arjoon, Virtue Theory as a Dynamic Theory of Business, 28 J. BUS. 
ETHICS 159 (2000) (arguing that companies using ethically driven strategies 
perform better financially than those that use profit-driven strategies); see also 
Gabriel Flynn, The Virtuous Manager: A Vision for Leadership in Business, 78 J. BUS. 
ETHICS 359 (2008) (arguing for application of Aristotelian ethics to business 
management); Franco Gandolfi, The Impact of Leadership on Health—A Preliminary 
Discussion, 11 REV. INT’L COMP. MGMT. 222, 225–26 (2010), available at 
http://www.rmci.ase.ro/no11vol2/Vol11_No2_Article5.pdf (“[A] firm needs to 
  
2012] THE GLUE OF CAPITALISM 739 
economy.7 
This essay explores the decay in “personal responsibility” of 
managers under the Delaware law of business organizations and 
argues that one small but necessary way to restore confidence and 
effectiveness to the U.S. economy is to restore some minimum level 
of competence accountability for those who manage other people’s 
money.8 
Part II states the principles of political economy and law that 
shape this essay’s analysis.  Part III harks back to Adam Smith to 
make the point that managers insulated from personal liability tend 
toward irresponsible behavior.  Part III also finds modern support 
for this notion across a wide spectrum of U.S. law and legal 
thinkers.  Part IV describes the decay in personal responsibility 
under the Delaware corporate law applicable to directors, and Part 
V describes the even greater decay in the Delaware law on 
unincorporated business organization.  Part VI notes the 
contemporary profusion of manuals, guides, and exhortations 
urging responsible, competent director behavior but argues that, 
with liability for incompetence almost a dead issue, all the 
exhortations in the world will not work. 
Part VII explains the conceptual violence that Delaware has 
inflicted on basic entity law concepts and asserts that better liability 
 
have a healthy mindset and a deep care for individual, group, and organizational 
health in order to build and secure a competitive edge for the future.”); Eliot 
Spitzer, Strong Law Enforcement Is Good for the Economy, WALL ST. J., Apr. 5, 2005, at 
A18, available at http://www.happinessonline.org/InfectiousGreed/p39.htm 
(arguing that strong enforcement of laws benefits the economy). 
 7. See Robert Ashford, Binary Economics, Fiduciary Duties, and Corporate Social 
Responsibility: Comprehending Corporate Wealth Maximization and Distribution for 
Stockholders, Stakeholders, and Society, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1531 (2002) (advocating 
inclusion of binary economics in corporate planning); Ben Bernanke, Nonmonetary 
Effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propagation Mechanism of the Great Depression, 73 
AM. ECON. REV. 257 (1983) (discussing the role of bank failures in the 1930s 
shutdown of the banking system); Lynne L. Dallas, A Preliminary Inquiry into the 
Responsibility of Corporations and Their Officers and Directors for Corporate Climate: The 
Psychology of Enron’s Demise, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 1 (2003) (analyzing the fallout of 
Enron’s bankruptcy); Kenneth Carling et al., Exploring Relationships Between 
Firms’ Balance Sheets and the Macro Economy (Oct. 1, 2003), available at 
http://www.atl-res.com/finance/financeconference/jacobson.pdf (explaining a 
model of the interaction of financial and macro economies). 
 8. Obviously, the “Debacle of 2008” has multitudinous causes, many far 
transcending the questions discussed here.  For a recent and somewhat irreverent 
assertion that public agencies played a major role, see J. Scott Colesanti, Laws, 
Sausages, and Bailouts: Testing the Populist View of the Causes of the Economic Crisis, 4 
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 175 (2010). 
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rules could make use of the “best practices” admonitions to return 
a semblance of personal responsibility to Delaware corporate and 
unincorporated law.  Part VIII notes that the alternative is 
increasing federalization of corporate governance and thus 
increasing over-regulation of the U.S. economy. 
II. THE AUTHOR’S “PARTICULAR POINTS OF VIEW” 
Max Weber, the great sociologist and social theorist, taught 
that “[a]ll knowledge of cultural reality . . . is always knowledge 
from particular points of view.”9  As a follower of Weber, I begin by 
stating the principal points that comprise my view of this matter: 
• I support the market economy, not as a perfect or ideal 
mechanism, but rather in the same sense in which Winston 
Churchill endorsed democracy: 
Many forms of Government have been tried, and will 
be tried in this world of sin and woe.  No one 
pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise.  
Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst 
form of Government except all those other forms 
that have been tried from time to time.10 
• Market capitalism has its share of “sin and woe,” but 
centralized control has a far worse record.  Compare societies 
that make economic decisions a species of political decision 
with societies that feature private accumulation of capital, 
private decision-making on how to deploy that capital, and an 
essentially free market in the resulting goods and services.  
The differences, throughout history, are substantial, not only 
in terms of economic efficiency and efficacy but also in terms 
of individual freedom. 
• Market imperfections are inevitable, and wise and focused 
regulations are thus supportive of a market system.  However, 
the more regulation shapes the process by which 
entrepreneurs make entrepreneurial decisions, the greater is 
the risk to the market system.  It is one thing to decree 
substantively that “no corporation may dump toxic waste in the 
ground, water, or air.”  It is quite another to control the 
process by which corporations make all their decisions.  
 
 9. MAX WEBER, THE METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 81 (Edward A. 
Shils & Henry A. Finch eds. & trans., 1949). 
 10. THE YALE BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 154 (Fred R. Shapiro ed., 2006). 
  
2012] THE GLUE OF CAPITALISM 741 
Regulations of the latter type (which are increasing in the 
United States): 
 relocate decision-making power away from firms to the 
government; 
 move the economy toward centralized control (no 
matter how large GM may be, the U.S. government is 
still larger); and 
 shift decision-making away from individuals with 
success-based incentives to individuals with 
bureaucratic incentives. 
• As a lawyer and law professor, I am a “practical formalist.”  I 
believe that legal constructs have practical meaning,11 
accumulated over time and with more or less steady usage.  I 
believe further that recent developments in the law of business 
entities (especially in Delaware) have distorted some of these 
fundamental constructs in the guise of serving the market. 
• As a consequence of these views, I criticize changes in the 
dominant state law of business organizations that (1) override, 
distort, or reject longstanding legal constructs (2) so as to 
effectively immunize incompetence in those who manage 
other people’s property (3) with the inevitable result of calling 
forth more and more federal regulation of business judgment. 
III. LEARNING FROM ADAM SMITH: IRRESPONSIBILITY PRODUCES 
IRRESPONSIBLE BEHAVIOR 
In his classic work The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith made an 
important observation as to the relationship between manager risk 
and manager competence.  Smith was discussing the benefits and 
detriments of joint stock companies (with limited liability) as 
compared with private ventures (i.e., joint ventures and 
partnerships), which at that time had unlimited liability.  Smith 
began by explaining why the joint stock company is a superior 
mechanism for raising capital from the public: 
In a private copartnery, each partner is bound for the 
debts contracted by the company to the whole extent of 
his fortune.  In a joint stock company, on the contrary, 
each partner is bound only to the extent of his share. 
 
 11. Practical formalism is thus quite different from what might be called a 
theological formalism—i.e., the belief that some transcendental meaning inheres 
in certain fundamental legal constructs. 
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      The trade of a joint stock company is always managed 
by a court of directors.  This court, indeed, is frequently 
subject, in many respects, to the control of a general court 
of proprietors.  But the greater part of those proprietors 
seldom pretend to understand anything of the business of 
the company, and when the spirit of faction happens not 
to prevail among them, give themselves no trouble about 
it, but receive contentedly such half-yearly or yearly 
dividend as the directors think proper to make to them.  
This total exemption from trouble and from risk, beyond 
a limited sum, encourages many people to become 
adventurers in joint stock companies, who would, upon 
no account, hazard their fortunes in any private 
copartnery.  Such companies, therefore, commonly draw 
to themselves much greater stocks than any private 
copartnery can boast of.12 
Smith then turned to the detriments of the joint stock system, 
which have to do with the managers’ absence of risk: 
The directors of such companies, however, being the 
managers rather of other people’s money than of their 
own, it cannot well be expected that they should watch 
over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the 
partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over 
their own.  Like the stewards of a rich man, they are apt to 
consider attention to small matters as not for their 
master’s honour, and very easily give themselves a 
dispensation from having it.  Negligence and profusion, 
therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the 
management of the affairs of such a company.13  
Of course, in modern economies even partnerships have 
liability shields for their owners,14 and virtually all economic activity 
occurs through shielded entities.  But Smith’s observation about 
“negligence and profusion” remains relevant.  That observation 
extrapolates well to the increasing insulation from liability that 
Delaware laws provide directors and other “managers . . . of other 
 
 12. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS bk. V, ch.1, pt. 3, art. 1, at 586 (Ward, Lock, & Tyler 1812) (1776). 
 13. Id. at 586–87. 
 14. UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT §§ 102(9), 201(a)(4), 406(c) (2001) (providing for 
limited liability limited partnerships with a shield for general partners); REVISED 
UNIF. P’SHIP ACT §§ 306(c), 1001 (1997) (providing for limited liability 
partnerships).  
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people’s money.”15  
Moreover, it is a premise of modern U.S. law (outside the 
business entities area, perhaps) that risk of civil liability conduces 
individuals to careful behavior.  Consider the following statements, 
selected to reflect a wide range of areas of law and thereby illustrate 
the prevalence of this risk-responsibility premise: 
• “The availability of tort liability influences the behavior of 
potential defendants.  Product manufacturers have often 
changed the design of their products to reduce risks, in an 
effort to minimize their exposure to liability.  In fact, one study 
conducted by RAND in the early 1980s concluded that for 
lightly regulated manufacturers, liability was the single greatest 
factor influencing product design decisions.  Similarly, 
professionals such as physicians engage in defensive practices 
based on the threat of liability.”16  
• “If doctors know they can be sued for money damages, 
presumably they will be more likely to practice medicine 
carefully.”17 
• “Copyright laws define infringing behaviors (such as 
unauthorized copying), and subject violators to liability.  Thus, 
the law shapes the behavior of users of information by 
providing negative incentives for inefficient behavior.”18  
• “The affirmative defense [to supervisor sexual harassment], 
which carves out an exception to a general rule of automatic 
liability, shapes employers’ conduct.”19 
• “[T]here is at least anecdotal evidence that, at the domestic 
level, liability claims pertaining to environmental harm have 
led to changes in behavior, in particular when such claims 
were directed against corporations (rather than states).”20 
 
 15. SMITH, supra note 12, at 586. 
 16. Stephen P. Teret & Jon S. Vernick, Gambling with the Health of Others, 107 
MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 110, 112 (2009) (arguing for tort liability for 
parents who fail to have their children vaccinated, thereby putting other children 
at risk). 
 17. Hickman v. Grp. Health Plan, Inc., 396 N.W.2d 10, 16 (Minn. 1986) 
(“Presumably, too, doctors try to be careful whether or not they can be sued.  But 
in an imperfect world, even with lawsuits, people will still be careless.”). 
 18. Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyrights in CyberspaceRights Without Laws?, 73 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 1155, 1157 n.5 (1998). 
 19. Joanna L. Grossman, The Culture of Compliance: The Final Triumph of Form 
over Substance in Sexual Harassment Law, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 8 (2003) 
(alteration in original). 
 20. Michael G. Faure & André Nollkaemper, International Liability as an 
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• “Civil liability under section 11 [of the Securities Act] and 
similar provisions was designed not so much to compensate 
the defrauded purchaser as to promote enforcement of the 
Act and to deter negligence by providing a penalty for those 
who fail in their duties.”21 
• “Under an ex ante conception, the function of the insurer’s 
liability for bad faith [in responding to claims] is judged by the 
manner in which the threat of liability will affect insurer 
behavior.  Under this conception, the threat of liability 
functions to correct possible underenforcement and conflict-
of-interest problems.  In first-party insurance, the cost to the 
policyholder of bringing suit for breach of contract makes it 
possible for the insurer to deny legitimate claims because the 
traditional rules governing damages award the successful 
claimant only the amount to which she is entitled under the 
policy.  By threatening insurers who wrongfully deny claims 
with liability for extracontractual damages, bad faith liability 
has the potential to correct such underenforcement: Any 
benefit to be gained by denying a claim must be offset by the 
additional liability the insurer will face if it is later found to 
have denied the claim in ‘bad faith.’ . . . As an antidote to the 
traditional view of civil liability as a system of corrective justice, 
this modern way of thinking about civil liability from the ex 
ante perspective has been extraordinarily useful.  It has 
encouraged judges and legal scholars to consider more 
carefully what has always been obvious-that liability rules not 
only compensate, but also deter.”22 
• “Although commentators disagree on which liability theories 
will best accomplish these tort goals, virtually all social 
engineering and ‘law and economics’ analyses share one 
central behavioral assumption—that imposition of liability 
substantially affects how categories of actors respond to the 
risks they create or confront.”23 
• “Economists approach civil liability as a system of incentives 
 
Instrument to Prevent and Compensate for Climate Change, 26A STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 123, 
141 (2007). 
 21. Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1288 (2d Cir. 1969) 
(alteration in original). 
 22. Kenneth S. Abraham, The Natural History of the Insurer’s Liability for Bad 
Faith, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1295, 1309, 1310–11 (1994) (alteration in original). 
 23. Howard A. Latin, Problem-Solving Behavior and Theories of Tort Liability, 73 
CAL. L. REV. 677, 677 (1985). 
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designed to encourage or deter future behavior.”24 
• “[Section] 1983 [civil action for deprivation of rights under 
the color of law] was intended not only to provide 
compensation to the victims of past abuses, but to serve as a 
deterrent against future constitutional deprivations, as well.  
The knowledge that a municipality will be liable for all of its 
injurious conduct, whether committed in good faith or not, 
should create an incentive for officials who may harbor doubts 
about the lawfulness of their intended actions to err on the 
side of protecting citizens’ constitutional rights.  Furthermore, 
the threat that damages might be levied against the city may 
encourage those in a policymaking position to institute 
internal rules and programs designed to minimize the 
likelihood of unintentional infringements on constitutional 
rights.  Such procedures are particularly beneficial in 
preventing those ‘systemic’ injuries that result not so much 
from the conduct of any single individual, but from the 
interactive behavior of several government officials, each of 
whom may be acting in good faith.”25 
As will shortly be shown, these precepts have no place in the 
modern Delaware law of business organizations. 
IV. THE DECAY OF PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN DELAWARE 
CORPORATE LAW 
Delaware law has always been careful about imposing liability 
on corporate directors.  Delaware states its duty of care as the 
avoidance of “gross negligence” and uses the business judgment 
rule to reinforce the protections against personal liability for 
directors of Delaware corporations.  Multi-volume treatises have 
been written on the nuance of the business judgment rule, but 
essentially the rule: 
• obliges those with ultimate management authority to comply 
with the duties of loyalty and care; 
• recognizes that the duty of care has both a process aspect and 
a substantive (or outcome) aspect but in ordinary 
circumstances accords minimal importance to the outcome 
 
 24. June R. Carbone & Margaret F. Brinig, Rethinking Marriage: Feminist 
Ideology, Economic Change, and Divorce Reform, 65 TUL. L. REV. 953, 954 (1991). 
 25. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 651–52 (1980) (alteration in 
original) (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted). 
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aspect26; and, 
• presumes that those with management authority have met 
their duties, thereby placing the burden of proof on 
plaintiffs.27 
The business judgment rule is intended to free 
entrepreneurial managers to take appropriate risks, which are 
necessary to survival and profitability in the “dog eat dog” world of 
the market.  In 1982, in Joy v. North, Judge Ralph Winter wrote a 
cogent explanation and defense of the business judgment rule: 
While it is often stated that corporate directors and 
officers will be liable for negligence in carrying out their 
corporate duties, all seem agreed that such a statement is 
misleading.  Whereas an automobile driver who makes a 
mistake in judgment as to speed or distance injuring a 
pedestrian will likely be called upon to respond in 
damages, a corporate officer who makes a mistake in 
judgment as to economic conditions, consumer tastes or 
production line efficiency will rarely, if ever, be found 
liable for damages suffered by the corporation.  Whatever 
the terminology, the fact is that liability is rarely imposed 
upon corporate directors or officers simply for bad 
judgment[,] and this reluctance to impose liability for 
unsuccessful business decisions has been doctrinally 
labelled the business judgment rule.  Although the rule 
has suffered under academic criticism, it is not without 
rational basis. 
       First, shareholders to a very real degree voluntarily 
undertake the risk of bad business judgment.  Investors 
need not buy stock, for investment markets offer an array 
of opportunities less vulnerable to mistakes in judgment 
by corporate officers.  Nor need investors buy stock in 
particular corporations.  In the exercise of what is 
genuinely a free choice, the quality of a firm’s 
management is often decisive and information is available 
from professional advisors.  Since shareholders can and 
do select among investments partly on the basis of 
 
 26. Thus it is almost impossible to find an ordinary duty of care case in which 
the directors used acceptable process but were found wanting for having 
nonetheless achieved an unreasonably bad outcome.  “When applying the duty of 
care, courts focus their inquiry on management’s efforts in arriving at the decision 
rather than on the wisdom of the decision itself.”  3A WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, 
FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1036 (2002 & Supp. 
2009–2010). 
 27. Id. 
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management, the business judgment rule merely 
recognizes a certain voluntariness in undertaking the risk 
of bad business decisions. 
       Second, courts recognize that after-the-fact litigation 
is a most imperfect device to evaluate corporate business 
decisions.  The circumstances surrounding a corporate 
decision are not easily reconstructed in a courtroom years 
later, since business imperatives often call for quick 
decisions, inevitably based on less than perfect 
information.  The entrepreneur’s function is to encounter 
risks and to confront uncertainty, and a reasoned decision 
at the time made may seem a wild hunch viewed years 
later against a background of perfect knowledge. 
       Third, because potential profit often corresponds to 
the potential risk, it is very much in the interest of 
shareholders that the law not create incentives for overly 
cautious corporate decisions.  Some opportunities offer 
great profits at the risk of very substantial losses, while the 
alternatives offer less risk of loss but also less potential 
profit.  Shareholders can reduce the volatility of risk by 
diversifying their holdings.  In the case of the diversified 
shareholder, the seemingly more risky alternatives may 
well be the best choice since great losses in some stocks 
will over time be offset by even greater gains in others.  
Given mutual funds and similar forms of diversified 
investment, courts need not bend over backwards to give 
special protection to shareholders who refuse to reduce 
the volatility of risk by not diversifying.  A rule which 
penalizes the choice of seemingly riskier alternatives thus 
may not be in the interest of shareholders generally.  
       Whatever its merit, however, the business judgment 
rule extends only as far as the reasons which justify its 
existence.  Thus, it does not apply in cases, e.g., in which 
the corporate decision lacks a business purpose, is tainted 
by a conflict of interest, is so egregious as to amount to a 
no-win decision, or results from an obvious and prolonged 
failure to exercise oversight or supervision.  Other 
examples may occur.28 
 
 28. Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885–86 (2d Cir. 1982) (footnotes omitted) 
(citations omitted).  The assertion that shareholders voluntarily undertake the risk 
of bad judgment does not delineate the extent of that risk.  For example, a 
reasonable investor might well accept that even given a reasonable, business-like 
approach to decisions, mistakes will sometimes occur while not accepting the notion that 
decision makers should be insulated from liability even if their decision making process was 
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We will return to the analogy of the careless driver in Part VII, 
but for the moment let us add to Judge Winter’s views a recent 
statement by E. Norman Veasey, former Chief Justice of the 
Delaware Supreme Court: 
[T]he taking of prudent risks by directors, acting in 
accord with their state law fiduciary duties of care and 
loyalty, is the engine of business strategy and is protected 
by the business judgment rule.  The business judgment 
rule is alive and well, . . . and it animates state internal 
corporate affairs law, as exemplified by Delaware court 
decisions.29 
In 1985, the Delaware Supreme Court caused what seemed to 
be a tectonic shift in the landscape of the business judgment rule, 
particularly the duty of care.30  In Smith v. Van Gorkom¸ a case 
concerning a cash-out merger for an allegedly inadequate price, 
the court agreed with the complaining shareholders that the 
target’s directors—“all honourable men”31—had abandoned their 
duty of care.  The target was Trans Union, and its CEO and board 
chair, Jerome Van Gorkom, was the moving force behind the 
approval.  According to the Delaware Supreme Court: 
The directors (1) did not adequately inform themselves as 
to Van Gorkom’s role in forcing the “sale” of the 
Company and in establishing the per share purchase 
 
shoddy to the point of incompetence. 
 29. E. Norman Veasey, The Challenges for Directors in Piloting Through State and 
Federal Standards in the Maelstrom of Risk Management, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1, 3 
(2010). 
 30. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), overruled on other grounds 
by Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 715 n.54 (Del. 2009). 
 31. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR, act 3, sc. 2 (Antony’s funeral 
oration).  The Van Gorkom decision did not quote Shakespeare, but did note:  
Trans Union’s five “inside” directors had backgrounds in law and 
accounting, 116 years of collective employment by the Company and 68 
years of combined experience on its Board. Trans Union’s five “outside” 
directors included four chief executives of major corporations and an 
economist who was a former dean of a major school of business and 
chancellor of a university.  The “outside” directors had 78 years of 
combined experience as chief executive officers of major corporations 
and 50 years of cumulative experience as directors of Trans Union.  
Thus, defendants argue that the Board was eminently qualified to reach 
an informed judgment on the proposed “sale” of Trans Union 
notwithstanding their lack of any advance notice of the proposal, the 
shortness of their deliberation, and their determination not to consult 
with their investment banker or to obtain a fairness opinion.  
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 880 n.21. 
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price; (2) were uninformed as to the intrinsic value of the 
Company; and (3) given these circumstances, at a 
minimum, were grossly negligent in approving the “sale” 
of the Company upon two hours’ consideration, without 
prior notice, and without the exigency of a crisis or 
emergency . . . . 
       [T]he Board based its September 20 decision to 
approve the cash-out merger primarily on Van Gorkom’s 
representations.  None of the directors, other than Van 
Gorkom and Chelberg, had any prior knowledge that the 
purpose of the meeting was to propose a cash-out merger 
of Trans Union.  No members of Senior Management 
were present, other than Chelberg, Romans and Peterson; 
and the latter two had only learned of the proposed sale 
an hour earlier.  Both general counsel Moore and former 
general counsel Browder attended the meeting, but were 
equally uninformed as to the purpose of the meeting and 
the documents to be acted upon. 
       Without any documents before them concerning the 
proposed transaction, the members of the Board were 
required to rely entirely upon Van Gorkom’s 20-minute 
oral presentation of the proposal.  No written summary of 
the terms of the merger was presented; the directors were 
given no documentation to support the adequacy of $55 
price per share for sale of the Company; and the Board 
had before it nothing more than Van Gorkom’s statement 
of his understanding of the substance of an agreement 
which he admittedly had never read, nor which any 
member of the Board had ever seen.32 
Van Gorkom was exceedingly controversial.  One major 
corporate law savant called the decision “one of the worst decisions 
in the history of corporate law.”33  Another stated that the case was 
“not only correctly decided, but is a sound precedent, reaffirming 
the basic obligation of due care owed by corporate directors to 
stockholders.”34  Critics contended that, so long as Van Gorkom 
remained the law, qualified directors would abandon their roles 
almost en masse. 
In any event, the Delaware legislature responded almost before 
 
 32. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 874. 
 33. Daniel R. Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40 
BUS. LAW. 1437, 1455 (1985). 
 34. William Prickett, An Explanation of Trans Union to “Henny-Penny” and Her 
Friends, 10 DEL J. CORP. L. 451, 452 (1985). 
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earthquake-like prophecies of doom began.  As the Delaware 
Supreme Court later explained: 
In 1986, Section 102(b)(7) was enacted by the Delaware 
General Assembly, following a “directors and officers 
insurance liability crisis and the 1985 . . . decision [of this 
Court] in Smith v. Van Gorkom.”  In Van Gorkom, we held 
that directors were personally liable in monetary damages 
for gross negligence in the process of decisionmaking.  
The purpose of Section 102(b)(7) was to permit share 
holders—who are entitled to rely upon directors to 
discharge their fiduciary duties at all times—to adopt a 
provision in the certificate of incorporation to exculpate 
directors from any personal liability for the payment of 
monetary damages for breaches of their duty of care, but 
not for duty of loyalty violations, good faith violations and 
certain other conduct.  Following the enactment of 
Section 102(b)(7), the shareholders of many Delaware 
corporations approved charter amendments containing 
these exculpatory provisions with full knowledge of their 
import.35 
The statement “with full knowledge of their import” is 
remarkable because it would take more than twenty years for the 
Delaware Supreme Court to reveal the true breadth and power of 
section 102(b)(7)’s exculpatory provisions.36  The uncertainty—
which eventually was resolved emphatically in favor of directors—
had to do with the exception for “good faith violations.”37  As will 
be seen, that resolution effectively eliminated liability for 
incompetence.38 
 
 35. Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 90 (Del. 2001). 
 36. Moreover, it is questionable to what extent investors have viable choices 
on such matters.  Consideration of that very contentious issue is beyond the scope 
of this essay, however. 
 37. Emerald Partners, 787 A.2d at 90. 
 38. Arguably, the risk of such liability was never great.  Writing in 1968, 
Professor Joseph Bishop observed:  
The hard fact is that cases in which directors of business corporations are 
held liable, at the suit of stockholders, for mere negligence are few and 
far between.  As an uncommonly frank judge put it, “it is only in a most 
unusual and extraordinary case that directors are held liable for 
negligence in the absence of fraud, or improper motive, or personal 
interest.”  The observation was made 20-odd years ago but is still valid.  
The ado about the liability of directors for mere negligence is like the 
proverbial shaving of pigs—much squeal and little wool, at least for the 
stockholders. 
Joseph Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of 
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Section 102(b)(7) authorizes a corporation’s certificate of 
incorporation to contain: 
A provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of 
a director to the corporation or its stockholders for 
monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a 
director, provided that such provision shall not eliminate 
or limit the liability of a director: (i) [f]or any breach of 
the director’s duty of loyalty to the corporation or its 
stockholders; (ii) for acts or omissions not in good faith or 
which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing 
violation of law; (iii) under § 174 of this title [director 
liability for unlawful dividends]; or (iv) for any transaction 
from which the director derived an improper personal 
benefit.  No such provision shall eliminate or limit the 
liability of a director for any act or omission occurring 
prior to the date when such provision becomes effective.  
All references in this paragraph to a director shall also be 
deemed to refer to such other person or persons, if any, 
who, pursuant to a provision of the certificate of 
incorporation in accordance with § 141(a) of this title 
[authorizing the certificate to delegate board powers and 
functions to “such person or persons as shall be provided 
in the certificate of incorporation”], exercise or perform 
any of the powers or duties otherwise conferred or 
imposed upon the board of directors by this title.39 
Consistent with the Delaware legislature’s penchant for old-
fashioned, complicated drafting,40 section 102(b)(7) reflects the 
style of the “lawyer’s cha-cha” (one step forward and two steps 
 
Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1095 (1968) (footnote omitted); 
see also MARK A. SARGENT & DENNIS R. HONABACH, D&O LIABILITY HANDBOOK § I:3 
(footnotes omitted) (“Despite the growing sensitivity in the last three decades to 
the general problem of corporate governance and to the special problem of 
managerial responses to hostile takeovers and deep recessions, the short list of 
such cases compiled by Professor Bishop in 1968 has not been swelled by an influx 
of new decisions.  The traditional judicial reticence towards validating duty of care 
claims persists, and the courts remain reluctant to assign personal liability to 
directors except in cases where there is at least an undertone of breach of the duty 
of loyalty.”). 
 39. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2010).   
 40. The Delaware Supreme Court has stated of the vaunted Delaware LLC 
Act:  “To understand the overall structure and thrust of the Act, one must wade 
through provisions that are prolix, sometimes oddly organized, and do not always 
flow evenly.”  Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286, 291 (Del. 1999); see 
also State ex rel. Scattered Corp. v. Chicago Stock Exch., Inc., No. C.A. 95M-02-017-
WTQ, 1996 WL 946043, at *1 n.2 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 23, 1996) (noting a 
shortcoming of “the legislative gurus of the corporate bar”). 
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back).  The section nowhere mentions the duty of care, but once 
the exceptions are cleared away the gravamen of the protection is 
clear.  As explained by the Delaware Supreme Court, “[W]here the 
factual basis for a claim solely implicates a violation of the duty of 
care, this court has indicated that the protections of [a section 
102(b)(7)] charter provision may properly be invoked and 
applied.”41  Or, as explained by two of the leading commentators 
on Delaware law, “‘[T]he purpose of § 102(b)(7) is to enable 
corporations to eliminate director liability for money damages for 
duty of care violations . . . .’”42 
In theory, section 102(b)(7) is merely permissive.  In practice, 
its invocation has been widespread, even ubiquitous, perhaps 
standard.  Writing in 2005, retired Chief Justice Veasey stated: 
“[P]ersonal liability of directors solely for due care violations has 
largely become moot by reason of section 102(b)(7) of the DGCL 
[Delaware General Corporation Law].”43 
Initially, it was unclear how far section 102(b)(7) went to 
eliminate meaningful sanctions for incompetent behavior by 
directors.  The pivotal question was the meaning under section 
102(b)(7) of “not in good faith.”44  Some Delaware cases referred 
to a “triad” of director duties—not only loyalty and care but also 
“good faith.”45  Plaintiff lawyers theorized that fiduciary good faith 
 
 41. Emerald Partners, 726 A.2d at 1224. 
 42. R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, BALOTTI AND FINKELSTEIN’S 
DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 4.13[B] (quoting 
Rothenberg v. Santa Fe Pac. Corp., No. 11749, slip op. at 10 n.6 (Del. Ch. May 18, 
1992)). 
 43. E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, What Happened in 
Delaware Corporate Law and Governance from 1992–2004? A Retrospective on Some Key 
Developments, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1399, 1428 (2005). 
 44. Almost twenty years after the enactment of section 102(b)(7), the 
Chancellor of the vaunted Delaware Court of Chancery “observed, after surveying 
the sparse case law on the subject, that both the meaning and the contours of the 
duty to act in good faith were ‘[s]hrouded in the fog of . . . hazy jurisprudence.’”  
In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 63 n.98 (Del. 2006) (citation 
omitted). 
 45. E.g., Emerald Partners, 787 A.2d at 90 (“The directors of Delaware 
corporations have a triad of primary fiduciary duties: due care, loyalty, and good 
faith.”).  Whatever this “good faith” meant was different than the good faith 
mentioned in section 141 of the Delaware Code.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) 
(2010) (authorizing directors to rely “in good faith” on certain information); see 
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000); see also Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, 
Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993)  (“To rebut the [business judgment] rule, a 
shareholder plaintiff assumes the burden of providing evidence that directors, in 
reaching their challenged decision, breached any one of the triads of their 
fiduciary duty-good faith, loyalty or due care.”). 
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might involve some elements of at least process due care—i.e., 
attention to one’s task as a director.  If so, there would be at least 
some holes in section 102(b)(7)’s insulation of incompetents. 
The high water mark of this theory was the protracted Disney 
litigation.  In Brehm v. Eisner (part of that litigation), the Delaware 
Supreme Court stated, “Irrationality . . . may tend to show that the 
decision is not made in good faith, which is a key ingredient of the 
business judgment rule.”46  This statement suggested a way through 
the shield of section 102(b)(7).  If incompetent behavior could be 
characterized as irrational, plaintiffs might have their day (or days) 
in court. 
Indeed, the next time the Disney litigation reached the 
Delaware Supreme Court, the plaintiffs (appellants) asked the 
court “to treat a failure to exercise due care as a failure to act in 
good faith,” that is “to conflate these two duties and declare that a 
breach of the duty to be properly informed violates the duty to act 
in good faith.”47  That holding would have put a major hole in the 
section 102(b)(7) shield, and the supreme court declined to do so. 
Actually, given the particular facts of the case, the 
interpretative issue was moot.  According to the court, even 
accepting appellants’ definition of good faith:  
[T]he outcome would be no different, because, as the 
Chancellor and we now have held, the appellants failed to 
establish any breach of the duty of care.  To say it 
differently, even if the Chancellor’s definition of bad faith 
were erroneous, the error would not be reversible because 
the appellants cannot satisfy the very test they urge us to 
adopt.48 
Undeterred by the specter of dicta, however, the court 
proceeded to opine on the meaning of fiduciary good faith: 
[O]ur analysis of the appellants’ bad faith claim could 
end at this point.  In other circumstances it would.  This 
case, however, is one in which the duty to act in good faith 
has played a prominent role, yet to date is not a well-
developed area of our corporate fiduciary law.  Although 
the good faith concept has recently been the subject of 
considerable scholarly writing, which includes articles 
focused on this specific case, the duty to act in good faith 
 
 46. Brehm, 746 A.2d at 264. 
 47. In re Walt Disney, 906 A.2d at 63. 
 48. Id. 
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is, up to this point[,] relatively uncharted.  Because of the 
increased recognition of the importance of good faith, 
some conceptual guidance to the corporate community 
may be helpful.  For that reason we proceed to address 
the merits of the appellants’ second argument.49 
The court’s analysis was driven by section 102(b)(7) and also 
section 145, which prescribes standards for indemnification and 
also excepts from protection actions not “in good faith.”  Noting a 
possible continuum including conduct intended to harm the 
corporation, gross negligence, and conscious disregard of one’s 
duties as a director, the court stated: 
Section 145, like Section 102(b)(7), evidences the intent 
of the Delaware General Assembly to afford significant 
protections to directors . . . of Delaware corporations.  To 
adopt a definition that conflates the duty of care with the 
duty to act in good faith by making a violation of the 
former an automatic violation of the latter, would nullify 
those legislative protections and defeat the General 
Assembly’s intent.  There is no basis in policy, precedent 
or common sense that would justify dismantling the 
distinction between gross negligence and bad faith.50 
The court then adopted the chancellor’s non-exhaustive 
description of the fiduciary duty of good faith: 
The good faith required of a corporate fiduciary includes 
not simply the duties of care and loyalty . . . but all actions 
 
 49. Id. at 63–64. 
 50. Id. at 66 (citations omitted).  The court’s conflation of sections 145 and 
102(b)(7) overlooks a key distinction between the two sections.  The constraints 
on indemnification under section 145 are greater than the constraints on 
exculpation under section 102(b)(7).  To qualify for indemnification, a person 
must not only have “acted in good faith” but also “in a manner the person 
reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the 
corporation.”  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (2010).  No such limitation exists 
under section 102(b)(7).  Also, under section 145 a further constraint exists where 
the claim triggering indemnification is “by or in the right of the corporation” (the 
situation when a director’s incompetence is at issue):  
[N]o indemnification shall be made in respect of any claim, issue or 
matter as to which such person shall have been adjudged to be liable to 
the corporation unless and only to the extent that the Court of Chancery 
or the court in which such action or suit was brought shall determine 
upon application that, despite the adjudication of liability but in view of 
all the circumstances of the case, such person is fairly and reasonably 
entitled to indemnity for such expenses which the Court of Chancery or 
such other court shall deem proper. 
Id. § 145(b).  Again, section 102(b)(7) contains no comparable requirement. 
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required by a true faithfulness and devotion to the 
interests of the corporation and its shareholders.  A 
failure to act in good faith may be shown, for instance, 
where the fiduciary intentionally acts with a purpose other 
than that of advancing the best interests of the 
corporation, where the fiduciary acts with the intent to 
violate applicable positive law, or where the fiduciary 
intentionally fails to act in the face of a known duty to act, 
demonstrating a conscious disregard for his duties.  There may 
be other examples of bad faith yet to be proven or 
alleged, but these three are the most salient.51 
Thus, as interpreted by Disney, section 102(b)(7) banished due 
care liability from Delaware corporate law—except for 
circumstances reminiscent of the famous widow Pritchard.52  The 
next significant “good faith” case essentially confirmed that point.  
In Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, the supreme court 
considered the board’s oversight function, particularly the question 
of “assessing the liability of directors where the directors are 
unaware of employee misconduct that results in the corporation 
being held liable.”53  The court approved the standard announced 
ten years earlier by the court of chancery in In re Caremark 
International Inc. Derivative Litigation.54  “A ‘necessary condition’ for 
director oversight liability . . . [is] a sustained or systematic failure 
of the board to exercise oversight—such as an utter failure to 
attempt to assure a reasonable information and reporting system 
exists.”55 
The Stone court went further, seeking “to clarify a doctrinal 
issue that is critical to understanding fiduciary liability” when the 
oversight duty is at issue.56  “[A]lthough good faith may be 
described colloquially as part of a ‘triad’ of fiduciary duties that 
includes the duties of care and loyalty,”57 strictly speaking no triad 
 
 51. In re Walt Disney, 906 A.2d at 67 (emphasis added). 
 52. Following the death of her husband, Mrs. Pritchard served along with her 
two sons as a director of Pritchard & Baird Intermediaries Corp., a reinsurance 
agency.  She paid no attention whatsoever to the business.  They despoiled the 
corporation and “spawned their fraud in the backwater of her neglect.”  Francis v. 
United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 829 (N.J. 1981). 
 53. 911 A.2d 362, 368–69 (Del. 2006). 
 54. 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
 55. Stone, 911 A.2d at 369 (quoting In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 
698 A.2d at 971). 
 56. Id. at 369. 
 57. Id. at 370. 
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exists.  “[T]he requirement to act in good faith ‘is a subsidiary 
element[,]’ i.e., a condition, ‘of the fundamental duty of loyalty.’”58  
Thus, section 102(b)(7) provides a shield for incompetence, and 
“good faith” opens no hole in the shield unless the incompetence 
amounts to disloyalty. 
Stone did leave one glimmer of hope for those seeking to 
impose liability for director incompetence: “[a] director cannot act 
loyally towards the corporation unless she acts in the good faith 
belief that her actions are in the corporation’s best interest.”59  
Thus, if shareholders could plead and eventually prove extreme 
incompetence, they might bring into question the “good faith” of a 
director’s “belief that her actions are in the corporation’s best 
interest.”60  If so, the shield provided by section 102(b)(7) would 
yield. 
However, three years after Stone, the Delaware Supreme Court 
ended that hope.  Lyondell Chemical Co. v. Ryan involved the 
heightened duty of care that applies when directors arrange to sell 
the corporation (part of the so-called “Revlon duties”).61   
The Court of Chancery [had] decided that “unexplained 
inaction” permits a reasonable inference that the 
directors may have consciously disregarded their fiduciary 
duties.  The trial court expressed concern about the speed 
with which the transaction was consummated; the 
directors’ failure to negotiate better terms; and their 
failure to seek potentially superior deals.62 
Narrowly construing the directors’ Revlon duties, the supreme 
court emphatically rejected the chancery court’s understanding of 
“good faith”: 
[T]he record establishes that the directors were 
disinterested and independent; that they were generally 
aware of the company’s value and its prospects; and that 
they considered the offer, under the time constraints 
imposed by the buyer, with the assistance of financial and 
 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. (quoting Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003)).  
Note that this standard is substantially laxer than the standard for indemnification 
under section 145.  See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 63–64 
(Del. 2006). 
 60. Stone, 911 A.2d at 370. 
 61. Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 239 (Del. 2009).  The 
heightened duties were first announced in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes 
Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del. 1986). 
 62. Lyondell Chem. Co., 970 A.2d at 237. 
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legal advisors.  At most, this record creates a triable issue 
of fact on the question of whether the directors exercised 
due care.  There is no evidence, however, from which to 
infer that the directors knowingly ignored their 
responsibilities, thereby breaching their duty of loyalty.  
Accordingly, the directors are entitled to the entry of 
summary judgment.63 
Summary judgment was appropriate because the directors had 
a section 102(b)(7) shield against claims of incompetence (due 
care).64  In addition, the court re-articulated the Revlon doctrine, 
rejecting the chancery court’s holding that “directors must engage 
actively in the sale process, and they must confirm that they have 
obtained the best available price either by conducting an auction, 
by conducting a market check, or by demonstrating an impeccable 
knowledge of the market.”65  These specific requirements had 
allowed the chancery court to suppose that the “directors did not 
discharge that ‘known set of [Revlon] ‘duties’.’”66 
According to the Delaware Supreme Court, the chancery court 
had misunderstood the dictates of Revlon.  “[T]here are no legally 
prescribed steps that directors must follow to satisfy their Revlon 
duties.”67  As a result, “the directors’ failure to take any specific 
steps during the sale process could not have demonstrated a 
conscious disregard of their duties.”68  Moreover, the supreme 
court emphasized: “[T]here is a vast differences between an 
inadequate or flawed effort to carry out fiduciary duties and a 
conscious disregard for those duties.”69 
 Thus, Lyondell reinforced the section 102(b)(7) shield in two 
ways: first, the case emphasized that incompetence—no matter how 
serious—does not constitute a lack of good faith; second, the case 
made the care duties under Revlon far less precise, making a 
“conscious disregard” claim effectively impossible even in 
circumstances when directors know that something special (and 
 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 239 (“Lyondell’s charter includes an exculpatory provision, 
pursuant to 8 Del. C. § 102(b)(7), protecting the directors from personal liability 
for breaches of the duty of care.”). 
 65. Id. at 243 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Ryan v. Lyondell Chem. Co. 
(Lyondell I), No. 3176-VCN, 2008 WL 2923427, at *12, *19 (Del. Ch. July 29, 
2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 66. Id. (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Lyondell I at *19). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
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major) is happening with the corporation.70 
In sum, twenty-five years after Van Gorkom, section 102(b)(7) 
means that there is no civil liability for extreme incompetence 
under Delaware corporate law, so long as the directors “go through 
the motions” of their tasks with sufficient visibility to negate a claim 
of “conscious disregard.”71  If: 
• “civil liability [is] a system of incentives designed to encourage 
or deter future behavior”72; 
• the “imposition of liability substantially affects how categories 
of actors respond to the risks they create or confront”73; and 
• it is “obvious . . . that liability rules not only compensate, but 
also deter”74; then it is equally obvious that the liability rules of 
Delaware corporate law provide no deterrence against 
managerial incompetence.75 
V. THE DEMISE OF FIDUCIARY DUTY IN THE DELAWARE LAW OF 
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES AND LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS 
In the United States, fiduciary duty has long been at the core 
of partnership law.76  The modern U.S. limited liability company 
 
 70. See Robert B. Thompson, The Short but Interesting Life of Good Faith as an 
Independent Liability Rule, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 543, 544 (2010/2011) (“In a post-
Lyondell world . . . good faith now seems orphaned in terms of having a liability 
function in corporate law.”). 
 71. The poison continues to spread.  See In re Massey Energy Co., No. 5430-
VCS, 2011 WL 2176479, at *22 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2011) (“That reality also exists 
because of the Caremark decision itself, which our Supreme Court has embraced as 
setting the liability standard in this context.  The Caremark liability standard is a 
high one, and requires proof that a director acted inconsistent with his fiduciary 
duties and, most importantly, that the director knew he was so acting.”); see also In 
re Dow Chem. Co. Derivative Litig., No. 4349-CC, 2010 WL 66769, at *10 (Del. Ch. 
Jan. 11, 2010) (explaining that because the Caremark test is rooted in the concept 
of good faith, “plaintiffs must plead particularized facts showing bad faith”). 
 72. Carbone & Brinig, supra note 24, at 954.  
 73. Latin, supra note 23, at 677.  
 74. Abraham, supra note 22, at 1311.  
 75. See Jamie L. Kastler, Note, The Problem with Waste: Delaware’s Lenient 
Treatment of Waste Claims at the Demand Stage of Derivative Litigation, 95 MINN. L. REV. 
1899, 1918–19 (2011) (“Delaware courts should remove the current fog of 
ambiguity around the waste standard and explicitly state that waste is a part of the 
duty of good faith. . . . An explicit ruling that places waste under good faith would 
provide a new mechanism for shareholders to hold directors accountable for their 
irrational business decisions.”).  This change would be an improvement, but is not 
likely to occur. 
 76. DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS, AND LLCS: EXAMPLES AND 
EXPLANATIONS §§ 9.7.2, 9.8 (3d ed. 2008); D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource 
Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399, 1458 (2002) (“[C]ourts predictably 
  
2012] THE GLUE OF CAPITALISM 759 
(LLC) began as a partnership-like structure with a corporate-like 
liability shield,77 and of course a limited partnership is a type of 
partnership. 
Delaware crafted its LLC act from its limited partnership act,78 
and many early Delaware LLC cases concern issues of fiduciary 
duty.  However, both the Delaware LLC and limited partnership 
statutes contain language generally embracing “freedom of 
contract”79 and specifically authorizing LLC and partnership 
agreements to address questions of fiduciary duty.80  Moreover, 
both statutes create broad exculpatory powers for LLC and 
partnership agreements.81 
Initially, Delaware’s limited partnership and LLC statutes 
merely authorized a partnership or LLC agreement to restrict 
fiduciary duties, and in 2002 the Delaware Supreme Court 
explicitly engaged in dicta to warn that “restrict” did not entail 
“eliminate.”82  In 2004, the Delaware legislature responded, 
including the word “eliminate” in both statutes and also expressly 
authorizing broad exculpatory provisions.83 
 
impose fiduciary duties in the partnership context.”). 
 77. KLEINBERGER, supra note 76, at ch. 13. 
 78. CARTER G. BISHOP & DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES: 
TAX AND BUSINESS LAW ¶ 14.01[2] (1994 & Supp. 2011-1). 
 79. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-1101(c) (2010) (“It is the policy of this chapter 
to give maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract and to the 
enforceability of partnership agreements.”); id. § 18-1101(b) (2010) (same as to 
limited liability company agreements). 
 80. Id. § 17-1101(d) (“To the extent that, at law or in equity, a partner or 
other person has duties (including fiduciary duties) to a limited partnership or to 
another partner or to another person that is a party to or is otherwise bound by a 
partnership agreement, the partner’s or other person’s duties may be expanded or 
restricted or eliminated by provisions in the partnership agreement; provided that 
the partnership agreement may not eliminate the implied contractual covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing.”); id. § 18-1101(c) (same as to limited liability 
company agreements). 
 81. Id. § 17-1101(f) (“A partnership agreement may provide for the limitation 
or elimination of any and all liabilities for breach of contract and breach of duties 
(including fiduciary duties) of a partner or other person to a limited partnership 
or to another partner or to an other person that is a party to or is otherwise bound 
by a partnership agreement; provided, that a partnership agreement may not limit 
or eliminate liability for any act or omission that constitutes a bad faith violation of 
the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing.”); id. § 18-1101(e) 
(same as to limited liability company agreements). 
 82. Gotham Partners v. Hallwood Realty Partners, 817 A.2d 160, 167–68 (Del. 
2002).  For a detailed discussion of this decision and the response of the Delaware 
legislature, see BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 78 ¶ 14.05[4][a][i], [ii]. 
 83. BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 78 ¶ 14.05[4][a][ii]. 
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Delaware courts still require clear language to eliminate 
fiduciary duties.84  But when the language is clear, so is the effect.  
For example, in Fisk Ventures v. Segal, the court stated: “[T]he 
Genitrix LLC Agreement eliminates fiduciary duties to the 
maximum extent permitted by law by flatly stating that members 
have no duties other than those expressly articulated in the 
Agreement.  Because the Agreement does not expressly articulate 
fiduciary obligations, they are eliminated.”85 
Likewise, Delaware courts enforce broad exculpatory 
provisions found in LLC and limited partnership agreements.  For 
example, in Wood v. Baum, the plaintiff alleged that the directors of 
an LLC had breached their fiduciary duties by improperly valuing 
certain non-performing assets, by executing a series of “related 
party transactions,” and by “‘fail[ing] properly to institute, 
administer and maintain adequate accounting and reporting 
controls, practices and procedures,’ which resulted in a ‘massive 
restatement process, an SEC investigation, and loss of substantial 
access to financial markets.’”86  The LLC’s operating agreement 
exculpated directors from any liability “except in the case of 
fraudulent or illegal conduct.”87  The plaintiff suffered dismissal on 
the pleadings, unable to allege with particularity that “the directors 
acted with scienter, i.e., that they had ‘actual or constructive 
knowledge’ that their conduct was legally improper.”88 
LLCs and limited partnerships rarely involve publicly traded 
 
 84. Kelly v. Blum, No. 4516–VCP, 2010 WL 629850, at *10 (Del. Ch. Feb. 24, 
2010) (rejecting the argument of an LLC’s manager that the operating 
agreement, by identifying only one fiduciary duty, implicitly disclaimed the 
existence of any others; holding that fiduciary duties can be neither restricted nor 
eliminated by implication). 
 85. Fisk Ventures, L.L.C. v. Segal, No. 3017–CC, 2008 WL 1961156, at *11 
(Del. Ch. May 7, 2008).  The Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, Myron 
Steele, has argued that Delaware should by judicial decision eliminate all fiduciary 
duties in Delaware limited liability companies and limited partnerships.  For the 
author’s views on that notion, see Daniel S. Kleinberger, Why Justice Cardozo Was 
Right, and Chief Justice Steele Is Wrong, INST. OF DEL. CORP. AND BUS. L. (2011), 
http://blogs.law.widener.edu/delcorp/?page_id=335&preview=true (article for 
on-line symposium hosted by the Widener Law School’s Institute of Delaware 
Corporate and Business Law).  For other on-line symposium articles, see 
Symposium, Default Fiduciary Duties in LLCs and LPs, INST. OF DEL. CORP. AND BUS. 
L. (2011), http://blogs.law.widener.edu/delcorp/on-line-symposium-default-
fiduciary-duties-in-llcs-and-lps/. 
 86. Wood v. Baum, 953 A.2d 136, 139 (Del. 2008).  The discussion of this case 
is drawn from BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 78 ¶ 14.05[4][a][ii]. 
 87. Wood, 953 A.2d at 139 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 88. Id. at 141. 
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enterprises because most such enterprises lose the advantages of 
partnership tax status.89  However, LLCs and limited partnerships 
play major roles in venture capital arrangements.  Here, as in the 
corporate realm, Delaware entity law encourages managers to 
insulate themselves from liability for incompetent management.  
Indeed, the encouragement is even greater in the noncorporate 
realm.  Under Delaware corporate law, the protection is necessarily 
indirect.  The duty remains intact; only damage actions are 
blocked.  In the noncorporate realm, the duty can itself be 
eliminated.  
VI. LIABILITY (AND DETERRENCE), NO; EXHORTATION, YES 
As Delaware law has increasingly disconnected managers from 
deterrence, would-be opinion makers have provided a wealth of 
advice for managers seeking competence.90  For example, in 2003, 
the Director of the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance gave a 
speech on “[t]he importance of directors in setting the standards 
for and being the exemplars of good corporate governance.”91  He 
focused in part on managerial methodology: 
 Devote the necessary time and prepare.  An easy one.  
With increased duties and heightened expectations, you 
should make sure you have the time to be a director, and 
especially an audit committee member.  You have to 
 
 89. BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 78 ¶¶ 16.01–.05.  There are, however, 
notable exceptions.  See Manesh, supra note 1, at 469 (“While almost all publicly 
held firms are organized as corporations, [the private equity firms of] Blackstone, 
Fortress, and Och-Ziff are each organized as noncorporations–a limited 
partnership in the case of Blackstone and limited liability companies in the cases 
of Fortress and Och-Ziff.”).  Manesh attributes this choice of entity to the greater 
power to abnegate fiduciary duty.  “Delaware’s noncorporate statutes permit 
noncorporate firms to opt out of the fiduciary regime by eliminating such duties 
wholesale.”  Id. at 470. 
 90. REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE, NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE 23 (Sept. 23, 2010), 
http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/CCGReport.pdf [hereinafter NYSE REPORT] (“Given 
the far-reaching developments affecting corporate governance and public 
company disclosure during the first decade of the 21st century, it should come as 
no surprise that during that same time period, various organizations, coalitions 
and groups have released corporate governance studies, white papers, and 
statements of aspirational ideals of best corporate governance practices.  These 
documents set forth certain core aspects of corporate governance, as seen by the 
various authoring groups.”). 
 91. Alan L. Beller, Dir., Div. of Corp. Fin., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 
Remarks at the Vanderbilt Directors College (June 10, 2003), in 2003 WL 
21515874 (S.E.C.) at *1. 
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consider your other responsibilities and then decide 
whether you can take on the position.  And the number of 
directors’ posts you can responsibly (both to yourself and 
to the company) accept is now limited. 
 Putting in the time also means doing the work and the 
necessary preparation.  It may sound too obvious to say, 
but read the disclosure documents and the other 
materials supplied by the company in preparation for 
meetings.  You should also insist that the materials be 
provided by the company in time.  Board packages, except 
for unavoidable last minute developments, shouldn’t be 
provided 24 or 48 hours before the meeting anymore.92 
These remarks followed the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act, which had resulted from the infamous Enron scandal (and 
others as well).  More recently, following the 2008 implosion, the 
New York Stock Exchange issued a lengthy report on “Corporate 
Governance.”  Among a lengthy list of recommendations for boards 
of directors is the following item, which carries an almost religious 
tone: 
One fundamental role of the board is to work with the 
corporation’s CEO to create a culture of high integrity, 
including adherence to both the rule of law and 
appropriate ethical standards.  This role includes hiring 
the corporation’s CEO and senior managers, and taking 
such action as is necessary to ensure that basic values such 
as honesty, trust, candor and transparency are maintained 
throughout the corporation.  Insisting that the 
management team create a strong ethical culture is 
essential to proper risk management and governance.93 
The American Bar Association has also produced a major work 
on corporate governance.94  The report includes a description of 
key board functions, attention to which would seem a checklist for 
matters a competent director will regularly consider: 
Board functions that generally are retained by the board 
and are central to their focus include: 
 Selecting, monitoring, evaluating, motivating and 
 
 92. Id. at *2. 
 93. NYSE REPORT, supra note 90, at 27. 
 94. CORP. GOVERNANCE COMM., A.B.A., REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON 
DELINEATION OF GOVERNANCE ROLES & RESPONSIBILITIES (Aug. 1, 2009), available at 
http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/committees/CL260000pub/materials/2009
0801/delineation-final.pdf. 
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compensating, and when necessary replacing the CEO 
and other key members of senior management; 
 Monitoring corporate performance and assessing 
whether the corporation is being appropriately 
managed by the senior management team; 
 Providing strategic guidance to the senior management 
team and reviewing and approving financial objectives 
and major corporate plans and actions; 
 Developing corporate policy; 
 Reviewing and approving major changes in auditing 
and accounting principles and practices; 
 Overseeing audit, internal controls, risk management 
and ethics and compliance; 
 In a public company, overseeing financial reporting 
and related disclosures; 
 Declaring dividends and approving share repurchase 
programs; 
 Making decisions on major transactions and other 
material events concerning the corporation for 
submission to the shareholders for approval; and 
 Performing any other functions prescribed by law, 
regulation or listing rule, or the corporation’s 
certificate of incorporation or bylaws.95 
The report also contains fine-sounding sentiments on director 
duties: 
In fulfilling their mandate, directors are required to act 
under the high standards imposed on fiduciaries, 
including the duties to act with due care (focusing 
appropriate attention and making decisions on an 
informed basis), with good faith and in the best interests 
of the corporation and its shareholders.  Directors owe 
duties of care and loyalty to the corporation and the 
shareholder body as a whole.  The duty of care requires 
that directors inform themselves of “all material 
information reasonably available to them” concerning a 
given decision prior to acting on that decision . . . .  
 Directors are obligated to act in a deliberative and fully 
informed manner and this requires access to relevant and 
timely information.  One of the very practical challenges 
in corporate governance relates to the difference between 
 
 95. Id. at 8–9. 
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managers and directors in their access to information 
about the corporation and the implications of this 
difference on the ability of part-time outside directors to 
hold managers accountable for the responsibilities that 
have been delegated to them. . . . Nonetheless, 
“[d]irectors must make reasonable efforts to ensure that 
they are being kept appropriately apprised of the 
company’s compliance with the law and its business 
performance . . . .”96 
Other examples could be easily found.97  But to what end?  If 
exhortation sufficed to inspire good conduct, none of us would be 
sinners. 
Consider an analogy from the U.S. law of lawyers.  For many 
years, the American Bar Association had a Code of Professional 
Responsibility, which was implemented in many states.  The Code 
was divided into Ethical Considerations and Disciplinary Rules.  
The former were aspirational; violation of the latter could bring 
real sanctions.  After much debate, the ABA eventually abandoned 
its dichotomous code, recognizing the aspirations without sanctions 
were only so much verbiage.  The Code’s replacement, the Rules of 
Professional Conduct, contains only enforceable disciplinary 
rules.98 
 
 96. Id. at 9 (footnotes omitted) (internal quotations marks omitted). 
 97. See, e.g., COMM. OF SPONSORING ORGS. OF THE TREADWAY COMM’N, 
ENTERPRISE RISK MGMT.-INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK: EXEC. SUMMARY  2 (Sept. 2004), 
http://www.coso.org/Publications/ERM/COSO_ERM_ExecutiveSummary.pdf 
(defining enterprise risk management as “a process, effected by an entity’s board 
of directors, management and other personnel, applied in strategy setting and 
across the enterprise, designed to identify potential events that may affect the 
entity, and manage risk to be within its risk appetite, to provide reasonable 
assurance regarding the achievement of entity objectives”), quoted in Michelle M. 
Harner, Ignoring the Writing on the Wall: The Role of Enterprise Risk Management in the 
Economic Crisis, 5 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 45, 46 (2010); Tina Chi, Corporate Governance: 
Boards Urged to Give Risk Oversight Duties to All Committees in Light of Dodd-Frank, 42 
SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1948, 1948 (Oct. 18, 2010) (“In light of heightened 
legislative scrutiny of corporate risk oversight, all public company boards need to 
ensure that the responsibility for managing risks is dispersed appropriately among 
directors and their committees, and not unduly given to audit committees, leading 
corporate governance experts said Oct. 7 at a Practising Law Institute conference 
in New York.”). 
 98. Benjamin H. Barton, The ABA, the Rules, and Professionalism: The Mechanics 
of Self-Defeat and a Call for a Return to the Ethical, Moral, and Practical Approach of the 
Canons, 83 N.C. L. REV. 411, 421 (2005) (footnotes omitted) (describing “the ABA 
Code of Professional Responsibility, which separated the general (entitled 
‘canons’ and ‘ethical considerations’) from the mandatory minimums 
(‘disciplinary rules’) and . . . the Rules of Professional Conduct, which eliminated 
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In a culture that generally backs competence standards with 
liability risks, why expect managers to respond to mere 
exhortation?  Consider, as a further illustration, the insouciance of 
then Citigroup CEO, Charles Prince, when asked about liquidity 
risks before the bubble burst in 2008: 
Regulatory agencies and industry organizations . . . began 
warning of liquidity issues in the financial markets in late 
2006 and early 2007.  When asked about these 
warnings, . . . Prince responded: “When the music stops, 
in terms of liquidity, things will be complicated.  But as 
long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and 
dance.  We’re still dancing . . . .”99 
So long as Delaware law insulates incompetence from liability: 
(1) the law encourages insouciance rather than business judgment; 
and (2) all the exhortations to best practices will be but a “toothless 
tiger.”100 
VII.   THE CONCEPTUAL ERRORS UNDERLYING DELAWARE’S EROSION 
OF PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
Two major conceptual errors underlie the erosion of personal 
responsibility in the Delaware law of entities.  The first involves the 
over-extension of contract notions, and the second involves an 
overly narrow conception of the law of torts. 
Delaware increasingly hues to “contractarian” notions in both 
corporate and unincorporated law.  Part V of this essay discussed 
the role of “freedom of contract” within LLCs and limited 
partnerships.  In Delaware case law, that role sometimes looms so 
large as to obscure the fact that an LLC owes its liability shield to an 
act of the sovereign.  For example, in In re Seneca Investments, LLC, 
the court stated that “[a]n LLC is primarily a creature of 
contract,”101 and in Fisk Ventures, LLC v. Segal, the court stated that 
 
the broadly moral altogether”). 
 99. Harner, supra note 97, at 45 (citations omitted). 
 100. The Model Business Corporation Act provides another example of the 
dichotomy of aspirations and liability.  Section 8.30 of the Model Business 
Corporation Act states “standards of conduct for directors,” breach of which one 
might expect to produce liability (assuming damages).  MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 
8.30 (2005).  But “standards of liability for directors” appear separately, in section 
8.31, are more lax than the conduct standards, and thus make the conduct 
standards merely precatory.  See id. § 8.31. 
 101. In re Seneca Invs. LLC, 970 A.2d 259, 261 (Del. Ch. 2008) (emphasis 
added). 
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“limited liability companies . . . are creatures not of the state but of 
contract.”102  
The current Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court is so 
enamored of the contractarian view of unincorporated entities that 
he has re-written the history of fiduciary duty.  In a 2007 article, 
Chief Justice Steele stated: 
[We must] come to grips with the reality that the 
contractual relationship between parties to limited 
partnership and limited liability company agreements 
should be the analytical focus for resolving governance 
disputes—not the status relationship of the parties.  When 
the parties specify duties and liabilities in their agreement, 
the courts should resist the temptation to superimpose 
upon those contractual duties common law fiduciary duty 
principles analogized from the law of corporate governance.103 
But fiduciary duty within limited partnerships and LLCs does 
not come from corporate law.  Rather, under U.S. law (including 
the law of Delaware), the partnership relationship has always been 
characterized as fiduciary.104  Especially in Delaware, the LLC is in 
the partnership tradition, not the corporate one.105  Therefore, to 
characterize fiduciary duties in limited partnerships and limited 
liability companies as an analogy from corporate governance is 
simply wrong. 
The reach of contract into corporation law is illustrated in the 
recent case of Nemec v. Shrader.106  The case arose when a 
corporation redeemed the stock of two former senior “partners” of 
the firm in anticipation of a major deal.107  Had the former 
 
 102. Fisk Ventures, LLC v. Segal, No. 3017-CC, 2008 WL 1961156, at *8 (Del. 
Ch. May 7, 2008) (footnote omitted). 
 103. Myron T. Steele, Judicial Scrutiny of Fiduciary Duties in Delaware Limited 
Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 25 (2007) 
(emphasis added). 
 104. E.g., Cantor Fitzgerald, L.P. v. Cantor, No. 16297, 2000 WL 307370, at 
*21–22 (Del. Ch. Mar. 13, 2000) (presupposing that general partners owe 
fiduciary duties; discussing when limited partners might also owe fiduciary duties); 
Continental Ins. Co. v. Rutledge & Co., No. 15539, 1999 WL 66528, at *5 (Del. Ch. 
Jan. 26, 1999) (holding that the fiduciary duty inherent in a limited partnership 
did not arise before the formation of the partnership).  
 105. The Delaware LLC Act is modeled on the Delaware Limited Partnership 
Act.  See BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 78, ¶ 14.01[2]. 
 106. Nemec v. Shrader, 991 A.2d 1120 (Del. 2010). 
 107. Id. at 1123. 
Booz Allen [the corporation at issue] was founded as a partnership in 
1914, but later changed its legal structure and became a Delaware 
corporation.  Booz Allen retained, however, the attitude and culture of a 
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“partners” remained shareholders, their payout from the deal 
would have been $60 million more than the redemption price.108  
The “partners” alleged breach of fiduciary duty and of the 
contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing.109  The 
Delaware Supreme Court held that contract can supplant fiduciary 
duty, even in a purely corporate context: 
It is a well-settled principle that where a dispute arises 
from obligations that are expressly addressed by contract, 
that dispute will be treated as a breach of contract claim.  
In that specific context, any fiduciary claims arising out of 
the same facts that underlie the contract obligations 
would be foreclosed as superfluous.110 
The hegemony of contract is a triumph of contract over 
property law.  The shift in perspectives means a shift in 
responsibilities and remedies.  “Fiduciary relationships are 
commonly characterized by one party placing property or authority 
in the hands of another, or being authorized to act on behalf of the 
other.”111  Once courts stop thinking about managers as handling 
other people’s money, the way is open to abandon “the punctilio of 
an honor the most sensitive” and decay into “the morals of the 
market place.”112  As asserted in Part I, “dog eat dog” among firms 
may make for a competitive market.  “Dog eat dog” within an entity 
undercuts capitalism. 
The tort-related error involves a simplistic notion of 
negligence claims.  Consider Judge Winter’s automobile analogy: 
Whereas an automobile driver who makes a mistake in 
 
partnership, owned and led by a relatively small cadre of corporate 
officers, who were referred to as the ‘partners.’”   
Id. 
 108. Id. at 1130. 
 109. Id. at 1125. 
 110. Id. at 1129. 
 111. High Valley Concrete, LLC v. Sargent, 234 P.3d 747, 752 (Idaho 2010) 
(quoting Country Cove Dev., Inc. v. May, 150 P.3d 288, 296 (Idaho 2006)). 
 112. The quoted words are from Justice Cardozo’s opinion in Meinhard v. 
Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928), in which he famously distinguished 
between relations inter se co-owners of a business and relations between businesses: 
Joint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another, while the 
enterprise continues, the duty of the finest loyalty.  Many forms of 
conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm’s length, 
are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties.  A trustee is held to 
something stricter than the morals of the market place.  Not honesty 
alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the 
standard of behavior. 
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judgment as to speed or distance injuring a pedestrian will 
likely be called upon to respond in damages, a corporate 
officer who makes a mistake in judgment as to economic 
conditions, consumer tastes or production line efficiency 
will rarely, if ever, be found liable for damages suffered by 
the corporation.113 
Judge Winter justifies this distinction in several ways including 
the inability of courts to effectively judge business judgment, the 
need for directors to make time-pressured decisions in conditions 
of imperfect information, and the fact that risk-taking is essential to 
profit-making.114  These facts argue caution in judging directors’ 
competence but not complete abstention.  In particular, these facts 
have little to say about judging the methodology of director 
decision making. 
Consider another version of the automobile analogy.  Suppose 
it is necessary that a person drive in a dangerous snowstorm.  Vision 
will be limited, and the risks of accident are great.  If the driver 
chooses one road over another and ends up in a ditch, we should 
not blame the driver.  However, might we not inquire whether the 
driver took elementary precautions before beginning the 
necessarily risky journey—such as obtaining a current roadmap, 
making sure the car had snow tires or chains, the windshield wipers 
worked, and there was an adequate amount of windshield washer 
fluid? 
While it is true that “[c]ourts are ill-fitted . . . to judge 
appropriate degrees of business risk,”115 Delaware courts in 
particular have fashioned several “process-related” standards for 
judging director methodology.  For example, Unocal Corp. v. Mesa 
Petroleum Co. contains a now-venerable standard for judging the way 
directors decide to adopt defensive methods in the face of a 
possible takeover bid.116  Revlon and its progeny did likewise for 
directors “putting the company for sale,” at least until Lyondell 
dismantled the methodology in order to buttress section 102(b)(7). 
The plethora of “best practices” documents (discussed above 
in Part VI) provide a starting point to return the duty of care to 
Delaware law.  The need is not to second guess decisions but rather 
 
 113. Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 114. Id. at 885–86. 
 115. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 263 (Del. 2000) (quoting Lewis v. 
Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 336 (Del. Ch. 1997)). 
 116. 493 A.2d 946, 954–55 (Del. 1985). 
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to vet the process of director decision making.  At least according 
to the New York Stock Exchange, well-meaning directors spend 
much time learning proper methodology: 
Not surprisingly, and as with the widespread 
developments in law affecting governance and related 
disclosure obligations, corporations’ management and 
directors have felt a need to stay current with these 
statements of best practices in the last decade so that they 
are not seen as falling behind the curve with respect to 
corporate governance matters.  Director education 
programs have proliferated, in an effort to bring the 
classroom into the boardroom. . . .117 
Courts should be competent to evaluate whether directors 
have at least managed a passing grade.118 
VIII.  THE WAGES OF SIN: INCREASING FEDERAL CONTROL OF PRIVATE 
DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES 
Revitalizing Delaware’s duty of care would require a revision to 
section 102(b)(7), which is exceedingly unlikely.  However, the 
alternative will be an increasing federal intervention into corporate 
governance.  Although Delaware’s Chief Justice is sanguine about 
the ability of Delaware law to withstand federalization,119 other 
 
 117. NYSE REPORT, supra note 90, at 23 (footnote omitted). 
 118. In the words of a leading treatise on Delaware corporate law:   
Even if the courts are not completely comfortable reassessing the merits of 
the directors’ decision, Van Gorkom and other decisions illustrate the 
courts’ willingness to review the process the directors used to reach their 
decision.  For example, if a target board does not fully consider an offer, 
or if its consideration of the offer is merely a sham, a court may find that 
the directors violated their fiduciary duty.  The courts’ examination of 
due care focuses on a board’s decision-making process: “We look for 
evidence as to whether a board has acted in a deliberate and 
knowledgeable way in identifying and exploring alternatives.  Within the 
context of this analysis, we are, of course, ever mindful of the realities of 
corporate directorship.”   
1 R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, BALOTTI AND FINKELSTEIN’S 
DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 4.15 (footnotes 
omitted). 
 119. Veasey, supra note 29, at 2.  
The [Dodd-Frank Act] will have a sweeping regulatory effect on business, 
particularly banking, and will have some effect on corporate governance.  
Mercifully, that latter effect, in itself, will be only marginally intrusive, but 
nevertheless, it is a federal intrusion that is undesirable as a matter of 
principle.  It will not, however, constitute a wholesale federal preemption 
of corporate law and corporate governance.  
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observers claim that substantial federalization has already 
occurred.120  For example: “In an apparent effort to restore 
directors’ adherence to their fiduciary duty, Sarbanes-Oxley 
imposes responsibilities on directors similar to the responsibilities 
required under state corporate fiduciary law, appearing to 
‘federalize’ that law.”121 
Moreover, creative lawyers are already turning federal 
disclosure requirements into surrogates for state law negligence 
claims.  In September 2010, a federal district court declined to 
dismiss a securities fraud claim that alleged, in essence, that AIG 
and its directors had mislead investors by falsely claiming 
managerial competence.122 
 
Id.  
 120.  For a cynical view of what is happening, see Renee M. Jones, The Role of 
Good Faith in Delaware: How Open-Ended Standards Help Delaware Preserve Its Edge, 55 
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 499 (2010/2011) (recognizing a connection between 
Delaware’s interpretation of good faith and federal intervention). 
 121. Lisa M. Fairfax, Spare the Rod, Spoil the Director? Revitalizing Directors’ 
Fiduciary Duty Through Legal Liability, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 393, 400 (2005).   
Sarbanes-Oxley adds teeth to the directors’ obligation by creating some 
greater specificity regarding this duty.  Moreover, these requirements 
regulate the internal operations of corporate boards in a manner 
traditionally reserved to the states.  In this way, Sarbanes-Oxley not only 
federalizes corporate fiduciary duties, but also adds substance to them.  
This federalization represents an attempt to restore directors’ fidelity to 
their fiduciary duties.   
Id. at 404–05 (footnote omitted); see also Adam M. Fliss, The Pendulum Swings: 
Federalization of Corporate Law and Its Effects on the American Capital Markets, 41 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 899, 899 (2008) (“Federal courts have aided Sarbanes’ 
intrusions into state corporate law by creating, enforcing, and broadly interpreting 
new rules that effectively supplant well-established state corporate law.”). 
 122. In re Am. Int’l Grp., Inc. 2008 Sec. Litig., 741 F. Supp. 2d 511, 530–31 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010).  The court explained:  
Plaintiffs’ allegations . . . are adequate to plead material misstatements 
and omissions on the part of AIG and the section 10(b) Defendants 
throughout the Class Period.  Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges with 
particularity that AIG and the section 10(b) Defendants, through AIG’s 
SEC filings, press releases, and investor conferences, beginning with the 
Company’s 2005 Form 10-K and continuing through the Company’s 
capital raising in May 2008, materially misled the market in the following 
ways: (i) failing to disclose the scope of AIGFP’s expansive underwriting 
of CDSs in 2005; (ii) failing to disclose that up to 75% of the cash 
collateral of the securities lending program was invested in RMBS; (iii) 
falsely stating that the Company engaged in extensive due diligence 
before entering into swap contracts; (iv) repeatedly emphasizing the 
strength of the Company’s risk controls when addressing investor 
concerns related to exposure to the subprime mortgage market, without 
disclosing that the CDS portfolio at AIGFP was in fact not subject to 
either the risk control processes that governed other divisions of the 
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In light of the radical effect of section 102(b)(7) and the 
“freedom of contract” excesses of Delaware’s unincorporated law, it 
is ironic to read a statement by Delaware’s former Chief Justice that 
“[t]he bottom line is that the Dodd-Frank Act does not alter or 
eliminate the protections traditionally provided to directors by the 
business judgment rule.”123  Delaware law has gone far beyond 
those traditional protections, replacing fiduciary duty with contract 
and thereby, as a practical matter, entirely insulating those who 
manage other people’s money from responsibility even for 
sustained and substantial incompetence.  The results cannot be 
good for a market-based economy. 
 
 
Company or the risk control processes that previously had been in place 
at AIGFP; (v) repeatedly pronouncing confidence in the Company’s 
assessment of the risks presented by the CDS portfolio, despite 
knowledge that the Company’s models were incapable of evaluating the 
risks presented; (vi) stating that the Company had the ability to hedge its 
CDS portfolio when in fact it was not economically feasible to do so; (vii) 
leading investors to believe that the primary risk presented by the CDS 
portfolio was credit risk, when in fact the CDS portfolio entailed 
tremendous collateral risk and valuation risk; (viii) expressing 
confidence at the December 5, 2007, investor conference in their 
estimates related to losses in the CDS portfolio despite a warning from 
PwC that the Company may have a material weakness in assessing that 
portfolio; and (ix) leading investors to believe that the Company was 
raising capital in May 2008 to take advantage of opportunities in the 
marketplace when, in fact, the capital was necessary to meet billions of 
dollars’ worth of collateral obligations triggered by recent downgrades of 
the Company’s credit rating and the credit ratings of CDOs on which 
AIG had sold protection.  Each of these allegations of misstatements and 
omissions plausibly and with particularity frames a claim of concealment 
of either a significant decision taken by the Company to expose itself to 
risk or a significant weakness in the Company’s risk controls that “would 
have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly 
altered the total mix of information made available.”  
Id. 
 123. Veasey, supra note 29, at 2 (emphasis added). 
